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THE MEANING AND ROLE OF 
PRESCRIPTIVE AND DESCRIPTIVE 
STATEMENTS: PARTICULARLY IN 
THE LEGAL UNIVERSE OF DISCOURSE 
Ivanhoe Tebaldeschi * 
I. 
In a sense, any positive legal system can be considered as a 
body of prescriptive statements. Prescriptive statements represent 
indications of models of conduct. They include most often the lin-
guistic expression "ought" (or "ought not") which works as a link 
between the grammatical subject and the predicate of the relevant 
sentence. Accordingly, prescriptive statements have also been 
called "ought-statements." This name has been mainly adopted 
in order to contrast prescriptive statements with descriptive 
statements, which are accordingly called "is-statements." 
Another label for prescriptive statements is "deontic state-
ments" or "statements having a deontic quality." Deontic quality 
imports a conceptual reflexion or conceptualization of the ought-
sign. Both in a general sense and in a specific legal sense, deontic 
quality constitutes a central concern of legal thought on its theoreti-
cally highest level. Inquiries according to different views and 
perspectives have been developed about this topic. Different ap-
proaches have been followed. There has been, on the one hand, a 
merely semantic approach in which the "ought" has been viewed as 
a special modality of reasoning. On the other hand, there has been 
an approach in which the legal ought has been referred to require-
ments of justice and needs of social life. 
These approaches either have at times developed indepen-
dently of each other or have evolved in interference with each other. 
In this field mutual independence and mutual uncontrolled interfer-
ence are both to be regarded as negative states of affairs. A compre-
hensive and satisfactory approach is here possible only through a 
general view of jurisprudence, able to conciliate and harmonize its 
formal requirement with its ethical and social ones. Only a unitary 
and yet differentiated jurisprudential approach can in fact offer a 
* Research and Teaching Fellow, Salzburg University; Dr. Jur., Bari University; Dr. Jur. 
Habil., University of Rome. 
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ground for a historical understanding of the past multiform relevant 
literature and an adequate and up-to-date theoretical view, able to 
match these different and yet converging requirements. 
In mentioning these requirements, the work and the creative 
contributions of Julius Stone come immediately to mind. The un-
derstanding of the legal "ought"-as far as it is requisite for a global 
understanding of the legal universe of discourse-has greatly 
benefited from the Stonian clarification and penetration of the rele-
vant topic in a formal and socio-ethical perspective as well as in 
their correlations. This article owes much to Stonian teachings. 
II. 
According to a prevailing opinion, "is-statements" are verifia-
ble, for they can always be regarded either as true or as false. Con-
versely, "ought-statements" have been considered to be unverifia-
ble. Admittedly, they have no cognitive status. They do not describe 
a state of affairs; they do not indicate how things are but merely 
state how they ought to be. Thus a statement that "something 
ought-to-be" cannot ex hypothesi be styled either as true or as false. 
Any attribution of truth-values to such statements. seems to be 
utterly inappropriate and even senseless. This opinion has given rise 
to a postulate which has played, and is still playing, a primary role 
in the field of practical reasoning. It consists of the assumption that 
no is-statement can ever function as a premise to, or as a conse-
quence of, ought-statements. The idea of an inferential process in 
which either an ought-statement is inferred from is-statements, or 
vice versa, has come to be regarded as a specific and striking kind 
of fallacy. 
The above postulate is now regarded as a key principle in the 
field of practical reasoning. It appears linked with unquestionable 
requirements of formal correctness and it has proved itself resistant 
to any attempt at criticism. But in spite of its formal impeccability, 
this view has aroused a feeling of uneasiness. It seems to imply 
irrationalism in both practical argumentation and morals. It as-
sumes that justification of rules of conduct or conduct itself does not 
rest on any objective ground. Thus the field of practice comes to be 
regarded as a realm of mere impulses, of unmotivated choices, and 
ultimately of whims. It seems to be surprising that human reason 
may have nothing to say about the main choices and decisions 
which men have to make in their lives or about evaluative compari-
sons of conflicting values. 
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Attempts have been made even in modern thought to provide 
an objective ground to prescriptive statements. These attempts 
have resulted in the assumption that some facts or a body of facts 
(e.g., human nature conceived either as a static or as a dynamic 
entity) exist as sources from which fundamental principles of con-
duct can be inferred. An important instance of these attempts is the 
recent revival of natural law theories. 
These theorizations and specifically the iusnaturalist view, 
have indeed been formulated in a way in which the postulate of non-
inferability of ought-statements from is-statements (and vice versa) 
has been neither confirmed nor satisfactorily confuted. Theoretical 
constructions of various kinds have indeed been excogitated which 
have tried to avoid or to outflank the problem of whether and how 
is-statements and ought-statments might be conceived as compati-
ble within a unique process of reasoning. Although some of these 
views have been acutely and subtly articulated-as Julius Stone 
himself has recognized in his treatment of the problem-yet such a 
problem, also clearly illustrated in Stone's treatment, can by no 
means be avoided. 
The relevant efforts of the modern iusnaturalist theories have 
indeed been inspired by a more than laudable purpose-the strug-
gle against ethical irrationalism and relativism. So far, however, 
these efforts, at least in the form of revived iusnaturalism, do not 
seem to have been successful. 
III. 
Despite the lack of success of the above attempts, the motive 
which has inspired them still remains significant. It seems that a 
possible clarification of the topic can only be achieved by a specific 
analysis of the "ought" -nexus. This requires a parallel and comple-
mentary inquiry into the "is" -nexus. The ought-statement can ac-
tually be understood only if considered in the context of the distinc-
tion between the "is-statements" and the "ought-statements." 
This distinction has been formulated in explicit terms only in 
modern times. It was originally inspired by a critical attitude to-
wards some earlier views. These were, on the one hand, "essential-
ism" and, on the other hand, "rationalism" in the guise of rational 
theology and rational ethics. According to the essentialists, any in-
dividual belongs to a typical class of beings; any such class has some 
characteristic features which are necessary attributes of it; they 
reveal not only what a given class is but what it must be. This 
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essential "must" includes not only a material but also a "final" 
necessity. It has a compelling power which is stronger than that of 
the expression "ought." It may be regarded as absorbing the 
"ought" in itself. In its historical origin, essentialism can be traced 
back to Aristotle and Aquinas. 
Rationalism belongs to a more modern state of thought. It has 
no link with qualitative early physics or the physics which ap-
proaches nature by considering its final causes-the teleological 
physics. Rationalism assumes that reason can demonstrate the ex-
istence of a creator God and the dualism between spirit (thinking 
reality) and matter (extended reality), a dualism that rationalists 
regard as the root or ground of any precept of conduct. 
Essentialism and rationalism are different as general theories, 
but their views about practical experience and morals had similar 
aspects. They regarded moral principles as apprehensible by reason 
in the mode of cognition. Both views have aspects that are not only 
unfounded but even naive. They may be considered a step backward 
when compared with some philosophical concepts of ancient and 
medieval thought (e.g., the notion of Plato's agath6n and of Augus-
tine's veritas), and are open to criticism from several points of view. 
Actually, criticism was levelled against them mainly (if not only) 
by exponents of English nominalism. 
English philosophy had already been antagonistic to classic 
essentialism. It was also hostile to the theological trends of rational-
ism: Descartes's and Leibniz's "providentialism." For English phi-
losophers, there was no ground whatsoever for the view that reason 
was capable of comprehending the final causes of existing entities 
and of natural phenomena. Nor did they consider it possible to 
draw the existence of a spiritual and moral order from cognitive 
data. They aimed at a knowledge which could be grounded on 
actual contacts with reality. They thought that such contacts could 
only be provided by sense experience, that is, by sensory percep-
tions. This conception of experience was accompanied by a view 
underrating the significance of discursive knowledge, which was 
regarded as consisting merely in an association and combination of 
signs in accordance with conventions. Discursive knowledge was 
therefore thought of as having no bearing on objective reality. It 
was conceived as being capable of yielding true statements only in 
the sense of a formal truth. 
English criticism towards essentialism and rationalism was ac-
tually formulated within the perspective of a sensationalist nomi-
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nalism. Sensationalism and the related nominalism are traditional 
in English empiricism. These corresponding views were expressed 
throughout the centuries in different versions and subjected to pro-
gressive intellectual refinement which developed them from Ox-
onian scholastics to Hobbesian materialism and from Locke's and 
Hume's antirationalism to Stuart Mills's associationism. The over-
all line of thought is still alive and operative in contemporary Eng-
lish philosophy. The topic of the relation between "is-statements" 
and "ought-statements" found a specific formulation in David 
Hume, a formulation which has remained basically unchanged, and 
to which the postulate of mutual uninferability of the is- and the 
ought-statements is still to be traced back. 
As is well known, a movement of thought emerged which was 
opposed not so much to English empiricism as such as to its appar-
ently paradoxical consequences. This movement was the "Critical" 
philosophy of Immanuel Kant. He tried to confute the main points 
of English philosophy, considering it nevertheless as a stimulating 
and awakening approach, at least as far as Hume was concerned. 
Although Kant opposed sensationalism, he accepted a large part of 
it. Kant's conception of the analytical statement (which he consid:. 
ered to be cognitively empty and endowed with a merely formal 
validity) may be regarded as a hangover of sensationalism. Kant 
tried to reform radical sensationalism by introducing a new concept, 
that of the "synthetic apriori." This concept however cannot be 
regarded as a real correction of sensationalism. 
The main point of sensationalism is that it admits a double 
kind of truth: material truth and formal truth. Of these, the former 
is the truth of experiential observations; it is the "true" truth, the 
truth in its most full and proper sense. The latter is the truth of 
discursive procedures, a ficticious or at most a second-class truth, 
namely a truth which accounts only for the correctness of a dis-
course and has no bearing on objective reality. A real alternative to 
sensationalism can only be offered by submitting to criticism the 
assumption that discursive truth is merely formal. Kant did not do 
this. He accepted the view that inferential processes as such must 
be regarded as a mere game with signs, capable of no other truth-
value than formal correctness. Indeed Kant postulated an addi-
tional use of the intellectual faculty by his notion of creative knowl-
edge (creative for him only as to the appearance of reality and not 
as to reality in i tselO . 
This concept of creative knowledge is objectionable, especially 
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in its post-Kantian version. Apart from this objectionability it 
should be considered that its very formulation rests on a negative 
assumption, the assumption that what Kant called analytical pro-
cedures have a merely formal validity. This assumption is here 
viewed as open to challenge. By criticizing the concept of formal 
truth and the related assumption that truth can be distinguished 
into formal and material, the subsequent discussion will propose a 
different approach to the understanding of descriptive statements 
as well as of the basic distinction between what are usually called 
"is-statements" and "ought-statements." 
IV. 
The procedures of discursive or rational processes may be re-
garded as chains of statements containing comparisons and rela-
tions between meanings. According to modern prevailing opinion, 
the above procedures can be styled as true only in the sense of a 
merely formal truth. This view is usually alleged as a corollary of 
the postulate according to which definitions of meanings are a mat-
ter not of knowledge but of linguistic conventions. It should be noted 
that this view is to be regarded not as a mere corollary, but as an 
"over-inference" from the conventionalist approach to definitions. 
Conventionality is not arbitrariness. The fact that the definitions 
considered as valid are those which apply a given linguistic conven-
tion in a correct manner does not entail that definitions themselves 
are to be conceived as imperatives or commands. 
A definition of a word is not a mere act of will. Above all, a 
definition cannot be regarded as an isolated and per se complete 
decision. A definition can make sense only if it is conceived as a link 
within a chain of definitions. Any definitional statement compre-
hends a word to be defined (definiendum) and a defining formula 
(definiens). The definiendum does not relate only to its immediate 
definiens. It relates also to any definition of the words that make 
up the defining formula. This imports that any definition does not 
constitute an isolated semantic decision: it springs from a complex 
decision or deliberation. A definition can be semantically valid only 
if it is compatible with and complementary to a series of definitions. 
In any definition, definiendum and definiens must be assumed 
as equivalent in their meaning. The assertion of this equivalence 
constitutes the very core of any definitional formula. As any equiva-
lence, this equivalence of meaning must be regarded as "transitive" 
in the sense that if two elements are assumed to be both equivalent 
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to a third one, they must also be equivalent to each other. A 
definiendum can therefore be defined not only by uttering its corre-
sponding definiens but also by uttering the definientia of all words 
contained in the definiens itself. 
The operation of transitivity of equivalences within a series of 
definitional statements requires that all the definitional statements 
must include a specific sign of equivalence which works as a link 
between their grammatical subject and their predicate. This 
equivalence-sign has been traditionally expressed by a variant of the 
verb "to be," usually by "is." According to the most up-to-date 
semantic conceptions, the use of the verb "to be" in this context has 
been regarded as inappropriate because it is reminiscent of essen-
tialism. A stipulation has therefore been issued according to which 
the traditional formula "X (i.e. the definiendum) is A (i.e. the 
definiens)" is to be transformed into "by X, I mean A." Not even 
this formula can, however, be considered adequate for rendering the 
specific function of definitional statements. This function can be 
adequately accounted for only if the alleged formula would explic-
itly mention the "equivalence of meaning" so as to imply the corre-
sponding "transitive" property. For such a purpose the typical defi-
nitional formula should be rendered, "by A, I mean a meaning 
equivalent to X" or more briefly, "X is linguistically equivalent to 
A" or even "Xis A." Although the last formula does not differ from 
the traditional one, yet it is to be understood in a quite different 
way. The "is" here uttered is not meant to recall essentialism. It 
refers on the contrary to the conventionalist approach, provided 
that this is correctly understood as implying the transitive property 
of the equivalences stated in linguistic conventions. 
As a whole, the words constituting the ordinary language are to 
be considered as links within a chain of definitional statements. A 
word can be considered completely defined when definitions have 
been formulated not only of its immediate definientia, but progres-
sively, of all further definientia until the entire series of the words 
has been exhausted. Considering that the meaning of any word is 
here regarded as a function of the meanings of some other words, 
the ordinary language cannot be conceived as including any mean-
ings stylable as "linguistic primitives," that is, as ultimate defining 
words or definientia non definienda." The global series of definitions 
(in which any word is indirectly defined by all the other words and 
is, in its turn, a direct or indirect co-definiens of any of them) is, as 
has been pointed out, a series of equivalences. 
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A series of equivalences must imply a basic unique quality, a 
quality which must be common to all its terms. It becomes therefore 
necessary to postulate in the field of language a meaning-quality 
common to all the words, viz., a basic unity or identity of meaning. 
The recognition of this basic unity seems to be indispensable in 
order that the single meanings of a language can be conceived as 
composing a complete system of equivalences. The recognition of a 
unitary operation of language is ultimately necessary in order that 
meanings can both singly and as a whole be really meaningful. 
v 
The basic unity of language can be thought of in various ways. 
One of them is to consider it as an area, namely the general "mean-
ing area" -that area in respect to which all single words are to be 
regarded as parts included in it. The expression "meaning area" is 
a metaphor. As such it must not be taken to the letter. Yet it can 
be helpful in order that the mutual relations between the single 
words may be more clearly understood. To think of an area suggests 
that it can be divided in various ways and that figures of different 
sizes and forms may be freely constructed within it. The only limita-
tion encountered in establishing the sizes and the forms of the "fig-
ures" within either a spatial area or a "meaning-area" lies in that 
figures must neither be put upon each other nor allowed to leave 
empty spaces, and that the totality of them must be equivalent to 
the global area. 
The unity of language can also be thought as "preverbal" -it 
constitutes what is ineffable, par excellence. Any theory of defini-
tion must imply the dimension of the preverbal. In essentialist 
terms the preverbal is given by the universal essences which are 
supposed to be ideal and eternal. In nominalism the "preverbal" is 
given by the data perceived through the senses. In a consistently 
conventionalistic view, the preverbal cannot be identified with any 
elements or entities already mutually delimited and differentiated. 
The preverbal datum can only consist in an indefinite and undif-
ferentiated horizon. Any differentiations and deliminations within 
such a horizon can only take place to the extent that they come to 
be translated into linguistic terms. Ex hypothesi, the "preverbal" 
datum is indistinct and unutterable. It can neither be perceived nor 
imagined. It can less than ever be designated by specific meaning. 
The preverbal can be recalled or hinted at only indirectly. A refer-
ence to it is, however, implicit in any statement. What is here called 
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the preverbal is to be identified with that basic unity of meaning 
which is to be presupposed in order that the series of meaning-
equivalences may be intelligible. 
When the verb "to be" is used in definitional statements it 
must be regarded as expressing equivalences. As it is so used the 
verb "to be" adumbrates and recalls the basic meaning-unity. In 
definitional statements this unity is what imposes its cogency on the 
statements themselves. In definitions the expression "is" may be 
regarded as a synonym for "must." For example the statement "all 
mammals are vertebrate" can also be expressed as "all mammals 
must be vertebrate." This necessity operates only within the as-
sumed convention: it is an intra-conventional necessity. The fact 
that the link of necessity is to be referred to the relevant convention 
does not imply that this link is to be regarded as a fictitious or as a 
weak link. The above reference implies only that the necessity-link 
is to be conceived as stated not in isolation but within the context 
of a system of meanings which, considered as a whole, constitutes a 
complete and consistent linguistic convention. 
A complete series of definitional statements constitutes a rea-
soning process. This process may be articulated through different 
ways. It is, however, bound by laws of global balance, that is, the 
requirements that the meanings must be mutually compatible and 
that together they must offer a complete system. If it is assumed 
that definitional statements are steps of a specific reasoning pro-
cess, it becomes possible to recognize that definitional processes are 
homogeneous to other processes of reasoning. 
In a general sense, the procedures of reasoning (in logic, in 
mathematics, and in the area of non-stringent reasoning), if carried 
out properly, lead to cogent conclusions. In sensationalist terms this 
cogency is interpreted as a mere function of the formal correctness 
of a discourse. This view has already been shown to be inadequate 
in the foregoing discussion about definitional statements. What has 
been said there may be extended to reasoning procedures in a gen-
eral sense. This cogency can only be understood if these procedures 
are viewed as articulations of a basic unity. This is the unity and 
identity of meaning, necessarily presupposed in any linguistic utter-
ance. It is not merely a rule of correctness and compatibility, a 
formal rule to be observed in any use of words or symbols as well as 
in any formation of clauses or formulae and in any concatenation 
of statements. It is also and above all the basic rule for meaningful-
ness. The violations of this rule do not import merely that formally 
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incorrect statements are issued. Ultimately these violations can nul-
lify the meaningfulness not only of singular words or statements, 
but of the entire universe of discourse. 
A primary requirement of unity underlies the rules of correct-
ness in a formal sense. This requirement imports that any linguistic 
utterance must remain anchored to the basic unity, the unity which 
the chains of equivalences between meanings imply and to which all 
reasoning procedures refer. This unity may be regarded as the pri-
mary norm of linguistic usage, that is, the objective law of this 
usage. In a strict sense it is not only objective but actually identifia-
ble with what used to be called objectivity itself. 
VI. 
According to the sensationalist view, truth is a function of self-
evident statements that are true in a material sense. Formal truth 
is regarded only as a vehicle by which the veracity of statements 
that are true in the material sense can be transferred to other state-
ments (though it remains somehow difficult to explain how this 
transference or extension of the material truth-value may be given 
any authentically objective ground). The central concern of sensa-
tionalism is the area of empirical observation. It must, however, be 
noted that this area is such that it cannot be strictly scrutinized 
without the risk of it vanishing altogether. 
Ex hypothesi, a merely experiential knowledge must be im-
mune to any intellectual contamination. It must consist in the re-
ception of a sensorial datum. However, a knowledge characterized 
by such purity seems impossible. A cognitive statement, even if it 
is most simple and elementary, must require a summary interpreta-
tion of the sensorial datum and at least a rudimental correlation of 
such a datum with other data. What is to be presented as given 
through an immediate and uninterpreted observation is always the 
conclusion of a reasoning process, even if this may be so simple and 
elementary that it may have been easily forgotten or overlooked by 
the reasoner himself. 
In the light of these considerations, descriptive statements can-
not be regarded as depositaries of the material truth-value. The 
concept of material truth, as a truth altogether independent of any 
conclusions by reasoning processes, seems to be unsustainable. This 
implies that the very denomination of "is-statements," as applied 
to descriptive statements, is challengeable. It seems in fact to be 
linked to the concept of material truth. Apart from its reference to 
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the above concept, this very denomination seems to be redundant 
(considering, inter alia, that descriptive statements do not neces-
sarily include the verb "to be"). Therefore, the name "descriptive 
statements" is preferable. The expression "ought-statements" may 
still be accepted as a synonym for prescriptive statements as the 
reminder that the verb "ought" is very often used in this kind of 
statement. 
Descriptive statements are far from being the only area in 
which the values of truth and falsity can find their original and most 
proper application. Although these statements can properly be re-
ferred to either as true or false, it is not possible to consider their 
truth-value as a mere function of these statements or of their self-
evidence. Truth-value may be related to descriptive statements only 
as far as these statements are regarded as conclusions of valid pro-
cesses of reasoning. 
It may indeed be observed that these processes themselves are 
always related to some statements which constitute their original 
premises. It must, however, also be noted that these very statements 
are in their turn conclusions drawn through other reasoning pro-
cesses. The processes through which true premises can be secured 
or proved are therefore inevitably circular. This circularity becomes 
no more disconcerting if truth is viewed as being primarily a func-
tion not of purported self-evident statements but of processes of 
reasoning in their unitary significance already emphasized. At this 
point it may be recalled that one of the main tasks of non-stringent 
reasoning is that of providing and justifying statements which can 
work as premises for further procedures of reasoning. 
The premise that the cogency of reasoning processes has an 
objective significance entails that any evaluation in terms of truth 
or falsity must be regarded as a primary function of discursive 
thought. Any argument purporting to establish that prescriptive 
statements may be founded on objective grounds must therefore 
make a primary reference to the objectivity and truth of discursive 
procedures. 
VII. 
A further aspect of the basic unity of discursive procedures is 
still to be examined, an aspect that opens the way to an understand-
ing of the nature of the ought-statements. As already pointed out, 
the discursive unity is what renders the inferential procedures co-
gent; this cogency must be regarded as strictly linked with the final 
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or teleological significance of the basic unity itself. 
The inherent function of language is a constructive function. In 
the actual usage of language new meanings are constructed and 
compositions of meanings or clauses are established, conveying a 
sense which is new in itself. Compositions of signs and combinations 
of statements may lead to results which are not only new but even 
surprising. Obviously these results cannot be predicted. However, 
they can by no means be regarded as fortuitous. 
This suggests, on the one hand, that a final intention must be 
presupposed as underlying any constructive power of language, and, 
on the other hand, that this final intention must be unexpressed and 
"non-verbal." The fact that this final intention is non-verbal does 
not entail that it is to be conceived as irrational. Its accomplishment 
includes, as an integral part, its translation into verbal and reasona-
ble terms. The final intention which appears to underlie all linguis-
tic formulations cannot be considered as different from the basic 
unity of meanings. It is an inherent aspect of this unity. The basic 
unity seems to be in turn not only the norm governing any linguistic 
formulation but also la raison d'etre or final cause of any such for-
mulations. 
At this point, the question arises as to whether or not a teleolog-
ical connotation may be included in the concept of truth. In ordi-
nary language, words such as "true" and "truth" as applied to a 
statement do not only mean that a statement is to be regarded as a 
non-falsity or a non-error. They mean also that the pertinent state-
ment denotes an aspect of reality which not only corresponds to 
truth in the strict sense, but is also relevant. It is to be noted that 
a true statement, when taken in the strict sense, means merely a 
statement that is not false, a statement hinting at some aspects of 
the reality which are "real" aspects, not fictitious ones; but these 
aspects are not necessarily central and essential. In this sense, true 
statements can also be marginal, inessential, quite unimportant or 
even misleading in respect of a wider cognitive concern. In the ordi-
nary or idiomatic usage of the word "true," a true statement is that 
referring to aspects of reality which are not only veracious but also 
important and essential. This extended meaning of the word 
"truth" is, as already noted, merely idiomatic, inapplicable as such 
in the field of semantics, logic and epistemology. This idiom is not 
lacking any significance. It may adumbrate an enrichment of the 
meaning of truth with a teleological connotation. 
An integral part of consciousness and reasonableness consists 
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in what may be termed the basic theoretical curiosity. This can be 
identified with the aptitude of any single mind to ask: "Why?" A 
unitary and simple "why" underlies any theoretical curiosity, a why 
that can be split into a causal why (how or by what cause) and in a 
final why (for what reason or what purpose). 
As is well known, modern science does not include research on 
final causes in its scope. This scientific unconcern with final causes 
does not mean that "finality" itself has no sense whatsoever. It may 
have a final significance. This derives from the fact that science has 
a need for circumscribing its field of attention in order that its 
research may develop with the necessary maximum of precision. 
Validity of science inquiries is, indeed, a function of the fact that 
the field of the relevant research has been previously delimited ac-
cording to a criterion of homogeneity of the knowable contents. 
As far as physical knowledge is concerned, the complex and 
organic development of it has become possible only since knowledge 
itself has started to operate within a perspective that prescinds from 
all "final" aspects. 
However, these "final" aspects are (or should be) taken into 
consideration (though within appropriate limits) in some specific 
areas of inquiry, like psychology, sociology and existential pheno-
menology. 
The achievement of valid and veracious knowledge is one of the 
human purposes. It requires that the inquiries into some phenom-
ena must be developed by totally prescinding from their final signif-
icance. This does not preclude, however, that the most complete 
and exhaustive comprehension of facts and situations-the answer 
to the integral primary "why" -is only conceivable as is only con-
ceivable as a comprehension inclusive of teleological aspects. The 
tendency to consider reality or the world in teleological terms seems 
to be connatural with reason. The operation of reason itself seems 
to presuppose that the universe must have its final reason of being, 
even if this very reason appears unknowable and indefinite. This 
assumption of a unique final cause is indispensable for the operation 
of reason. However, as to this unique final cause, it is to be noted 
that neither any specific knowledge about it nor any idea what-
soever about its theoretical approachability has yet been provided. 
The assumed teleological vocation of human reason does not 
authorize, at the present state of human culture, any formulation 
of specific teleologies. These particular teleologies, as far as they 
have been provided, remain ungrounded and archaic. Specific final 
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causes as instrumental in the pursuit of knowledge, may be argued 
for only in limited areas of experience; those areas concerned with 
the human world. These relevant conclusions are seldom, if ever, 
validated by adequate proofs. In a general sense, specific final 
causes present themselves as unknown terms which seem destined 
to remain such. 
This notwithstanding, any admission of an ultimate primacy of 
change or fortuitousness in the universal order seems not only dis-
concerting but quite destructive. An actual belief in such a primacy 
seems to deprive reasonableness itself of any sense. The fact that 
men are able to think in terms of projects and purposes seems to 
presuppose the notion of general and primary finality. The appre-
hension of the final cause of particular events, as well as of the whole 
would fully satisfy the aspiration towards an integral and exhaus-
tive truth. Though this kind of trut_h cannot be achieved, it must 
be borne in mind as a final ideal of any awareness; it denotes a truth 
that is also value, or a value which is also truth (something that 
recalls Plato's idea of Agath6n). 
In current human experience, the truth, as both a theoretical 
ground and a unitary end, remains a pre-verbal postulate never 
formulated but always implied, something that can be never specifi-
cally stated, for it must always be indirectly stated in any utterance 
related to anything known or expressed. The present discussion 
about objectivity and truth as recognizable in discursive procedures 
has been laid down mainly with an instrumental purpose. It has 
been developed in order that the concept of the end and a teleologi-
cal perspective might be presented; a concept and a perspective 
assumed here as helpful for a constructive approach to ought-
statements as well as to the question of whether and how they can 
be provided with any objective ground. 
VIII. 
According to the view which has developed in accordance with 
the sensationalist approach, the practical universe of discourse does 
not grant any room to "practical" statements different from the 
ought-statements. No recognition is thus given to teleological state-
ments, that is, those statements whose task is to point out means-
ends relations. Even when, if ever, such a statement is taken into 
account, it is still assumed as ultimately translatable into ought-
statements. 
The ought-statements are usually perceived as arranged in hi-
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erarchical systems. Hierarchy seems · to be connatural with them. 
This kind of hierarchical system may present itself as a deductive 
system: its higher ought-statements, or norms, operate as premises 
for the lower ones. Such a system does not include either descriptive 
statements or any practical statements different from ought-
statements (such as teleological statements). 
The above pattern of the ought-system must be regarded as 
different from the so called system a la Kelsen. First of all, the 
Kelsenian dynamic system is concerned not so much with norms but 
with acts creating norms. The relevant hierarchy rests in fact not 
on the extension or scope of the norms but on the authoritative 
status of the acts enacting the norms. Besides, a declared purpose 
of Kelsen's doctrine is that of explaining the legal universe of dis-
course, not in terms of an ought-nexus placed inside any legal state-
ment, but in terms of an inter-statement nexus establishing a corre-
lation between an hypothesized violation of a norm on the one hand 
and the enforcement of a corresponding sanction on the other hand. 
The view, according to which the ought-statements are ar-
ranged in hierarchical systems, rests on the assumption that a hier-
archical system of such statements is possible in a semantic sense. 
Though this presupposition has always been taken for granted, it 
could be liable to challenge. In the following discussion the idea of 
a "pure" deontic system will be called into question. 
In a "pure" deontic system the relation between an inferior 
norm and a superior norm must be such that the former is included 
in the latter in the same way in which a particular statement may 
be regarded as included in a general statement. In this system, one 
or more no~ms are given at the highest hierarchical level, from 
which all the other norms are derived by a process of stringent 
inference. Such ultimate premises consist of one or more patterns 
of conduct that can be analytically developed by applying the fea-
tures of the assumed "genus" to all the "species" comprehended in 
it. However, this kind of articulation, the only possible one for a 
pure deontic system, imports a semantic difficulty. Such a difficulty 
lies in the fact that the major premises, as any statements, can be 
meaningful only if the words composing them are regarded as defin-
able and if the global sense of any statement is intelligible with 
reference to a wider context. The words composing such premises 
would be definable only if each one of them could be rendered by 
other words which in turn should be definable within a consistent 
and complete linguistic convention. These conditions do not seem 
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to be met within a deontic system. In its formulation this system 
does not offer either a set of definitions of the words employed by 
it, or a frame of reference for a univocal understanding of the words 
themselves. 
When this is borne in mind, it appears that the only way in 
which correct and univocal inferences c'an be drawn from the rele-
vant premises is by sticking to the very letter of the premises them-
selves. If this course is followed, then the inferred evaluations of 
conduct must appear quite rigid and formalistic. This rigidity and 
poverty of content is most apparent when the deontic system is 
governed by a unique highest premise, by a unique pattern of be-
havior to be analytically developed. In such a case the system has 
a very limited, if any, articulation. If the governing premises are 
more than one, then the system, although seemingly richer in its 
articulation, is afflicted by an inevitable pluralism of the principles 
assumed to be supreme, for they are ex hypothesi uncoordinated 
elements. Nor is any unitary frame of meaning available to coordi-
nate them. Whatever the contents of the relevant deontic system 
may be, the above rigid formalism confers on it either a whimsical 
ambiguity or a dull pedantry and lack of human sensitivity. 
The pattern of deontic system here illustrated is a consistent 
and rigorous version of the conceptual pattern which has been sug-
gested by modern practical thought as explicative of the semantic 
and logical features of the existing bodies of social norms, mainly 
norms of positive morality. When considered as an explanatory pat-
tern of human and social realities the pure deontic system appears 
to lack any concrete significance. It does not derive from a genuine 
interpretation of practical experience but it springs from a utopian 
attempt at rationalizing the irrational, that is, of assuming state-
ments endowed with emotive significance (evocative of feelings or 
emotional experiences) are premises, or steps, of logical inferences. 
It must be noted that the "pure" ought-statements always in-
clude words which are endowed with a special sense, a sense evoca-
tive of emotive contents. As examples, words like "honor," "coun-
try" and "neighbor" can here be mentioned. Words of this kind 
inevitably occur in any pure ought-statements. They can in no way 
be made intelligible by definitional procedures. To use such proce-
dures in this field, by asking for example what is really meant by 
"human brotherhood," "family honor" or "love for one's country" 
would be considered not only irrational but even scandalizing. This 
use would appear as a manifestation of hard-heartedness or even of 
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lack of moral sense. The implied meanings become here intelligible 
only by being referred to the corresponding emotions. The words in 
question have not so much a meaning but a significance. The state-
ments containing such words cannot be placed either at the top or 
in the middle of any inferential chain. The link between different 
deontic statements cannot be regarded as one of logical concatena-
tion but rather as one of emotive association. 
The play of emotive recollection and evocation may permit a 
wide articulation between ought-statements and may give a deep 
significance to a body of them. When this has been recognized it 
appears that the word "system" becomes quite inappropriate when 
used in relation to the ought-statements. It seems more proper to 
speak of "bodies" (not systems) of ought-statements, at least as far 
as they are considered as "pure" ought-statements, that is, not 
translatable into any different semantic form. A universe of dis-
course articulated merely through ought-statements can be con-
ceived only within an emotive perspective. 
IX. 
The practical universe of discourse includes more than pure 
ought-statements linked by emotive associations. It also compre-
hends statements which are intelligible within a rational universe 
of discourse. These statements may happen to be expressed in the 
ought-form but this form is always assumed as translatable into a 
different form, so as to permit the organization of the statements 
themselves within a system. A system of practical statements is 
possible only if its basic and ultimate principles can be expressed 
in the form of teleological statements. 
The difference between ought-statements and teleological 
statements has been outlined to a certain extent. It needs, however, 
a specific semantic clarification. The primary question is that of 
establishing the difference between expressions like "ought" and "is 
an end." This difference becomes apparent if a set of paramount 
ought-statements and ends are assumed and compared. The expres-
sion "ought" has inevitably an authoritative feature. An "ought" 
may be traced back only to a higher "ought." Such a tracing back 
is not conceivable with the primary or paramount "oughts." This 
kind of "ought" must therefore remain unjustified-the ultimate 
reason why one "ought to do something" is because "he ought to do 
it." This is what in the previous discussion was styled as semantic 
rigidity. This rigidity is reflected both on the words composing an 
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ought-statement and on the global sense of this statement itself, a 
sense that no other statement can complete or clarify. 
Statements indicating ends present different features. The 
tendency to a teleological approach toward the world is connatural 
with reason. The primary "why" underlying any inquiry developed 
by reason is not merely a causal "why" but also a final "why." A 
basic presupposition of reason is that the question about the uni-
tary and ultimate end of the world (regardless whether or not it is 
answerable) must make sense and must be recognized as inevitable. 
In this perspective the ends which men may propose to achieve 
(either as individuals or as members of groups) must be assumed 
as compatible with the universal end, even if this is regarded as 
actually unknown and ineffable. 
Singular individuals as well as communities are constantly led 
to a rational effort in order that any of their particular ends may be 
put into relation with other ends and that the relation may ulti-
mately be enlarged so as to constitute a somehow complete sytem. 
This effort towards a general teleological compatibility may be re-
garded as a constructive effort; constructive in the sense in which 
constructing is a vital requirement of reason. 
An objection could be raised here. It may be observed that 
thinking in terms of ends is still ultimately a way of asserting an 
"ought." To say that something is an end is just a different way of 
saying "something ought to be accomplished." Even if this would 
be granted, the resulting "ought" should be different from the deon-
tic "ought" already examined. The "ought" into which a teleologi-
cal statement can be translated is not an atomistic and hermetic 
ought. A quasi-teleological ought would never stand by itself, but, 
by referring to a primary principle to be regarded as unique and 
comparatively ineffable, that is, expressible only through a set of 
ends which are assumed as mutually complementary and forming 
an open system, always liable to clarification and implementation. 
The teleological approach is inherently monistic: teleology expresses 
the monistic requirement in the field of practice. 
Teleological perspective does not prevent the use of "ought-
statements" in practical reasoning. In this reasoning ought-
statements are regarded as segments of wider contexts. Teleological 
perspective is the only one which permits the prima facie pluralism 
of the ought-statements comprehended in the same body to break 
and to suggest a unitary understanding of them. 
An apparent confirmation of this assumption may be found 
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through a survey of "bodies" of positive morality insofar as these 
may be understood as resting not on emotive but on reasoned justifi-
cations. A further confirmation, which will be specifically illus-
trated below, may be found by a scrutiny and analysis of the ought-
statements contained in positive law systems. 
x. 
The importance of a teleological perspective is most apparent 
in relation to the norms of positive law. Any positive law system is 
based on some authoritative materials, be they statutory norms or 
judicial precedents. These materials become fully intelligible only 
if the implied ends have been quite understood. This does not imply 
that the postulates of jurisprudential movements such as the 
Interessenjurisprudenz or the Freirecht must be viewed as necessary 
implications of a teleological perspective. Far from it, such a 
perspective should be viewed as not restricted to any specific move-
ment of thought. It is a perspective which can be considered implicit 
in any constructive legal approach. It is flexible enough to be com-
patible with, and (even unconsciously) implicit in, quite different 
trends of jurisprudential thought. 
A teleological trait is recognizable even in the 
Begriffsjurisprudenz. The fact that this movement was concerned 
with conceptual formations much more than with social experience 
does not mean that its approach to legal norms was not guided by 
any end or teleological idea. The purpose of Begriffsjurisprudenz 
was in fact establishing the so-called "certainty of law" and empha-
sizing the authoritative feature of law itself. Of course the teleologi-
cal trend is not only implied but explicitly recognized when more 
flexible and articulated views about interpretation and enforcement 
of law are followed. 
An explicit recognition of the teleological trend in interpreta-
tion and enforcement of law becomes requisite in order that flexibil-
ity of norms in relation to social change may find an appropriate 
theoretical explanation. Only within a teleological perspective can 
a flexible relation between given precedents and new judicial 
decisions be reasonably established. On the other hand, general 
constitutional principles, expressed most often in a teleological 
form, and legal prescriptions, expressed ex hypothesi by ought-
statements, can appear mutually compatible only within the above 
framework. 
A teleological approach is also essential for the understanding 
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of legal rights. A legal right attributed to a given subject appears 
prima facie translatable into a number of obligations towards the 
subject, imposed either on all members of the community (iura erga 
omnes) or on some of them (iura erga aliquos). This translation, 
however, is far from being adequate, for something important seems 
to have been missed by it. The utterance of a legal right is actually 
something more than an indirect way of mentioning one or more 
duties. The legal statement attributing a right must not be con-
ceived as an indirect way of mentioning some duties. Its primary 
concern lies instead in stating that a certain interest of a certain 
subject is considered endowed with a final value within the legal 
order, and is therefore assumed as a teleological criterion for the 
interpretation and the explanation of other legal norms, stipulating 
commands or prohibitions on members of the relevant community. 
XI. 
A topic in which the teleological approach may appear most 
enlightening is the relation between a positive legal system and the 
theories of justice. Ideals of justice are to be regarded both as a 
ground for extra-legal norms and as a criterion of interpretation and 
understanding of positive legal norms themselves. Two questions 
can be asked about justice and its relation to positive law. One 
question is whether or not justice may be based on any objective 
foundation. The other question is whether and how considerations 
of justice may be taken into account by those who interpret and 
enforce law. These topics would require an extensive discussion. In 
the present article only some very general points will be made. 
Justice may be viewed as related to positive morality though 
their specific concerns seem to need a conceptual distinction. As to 
morality, positive law may either subscribe to the contents of its 
norms (which in such a case become enforceable as legal norms) or 
support, to a certain extent, moral precepts as such. In the latter 
case, the problem arises whether or not it is regarded as "just" that 
law may impose some specific moral values on those who do not 
accept them on the ground of different moral views. It seems that 
this question could not be asked (let alone be answered) unless a 
distinction had been established between general morals and jus-
tice, a distinction which should be concerned not with contents but 
with approaches. 
Positive morals expresses itself through norms, that is, through 
indications of patterns of conduct. A theory of justice may be re-
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garded as a sector of teleological outlook. Its primary concern rests 
in a comparison between individual subjects so far as these are 
conceived as "co-final" in the sense that none of them may be 
regarded as an instrument for the others. 
This "co-finality" may appear an objective principle, a princi-
ple which is not merely formal but is contential as well. Though this 
principle may seem clear and univocal in its general sense, it ap-
pears vague and indefinite when applied to the infinite variations 
of particular situations. For practical operation, this principle re-
quires translation into normative statements. A guideline for this 
translation may be offered by the traditional rules of equal or pro-
portioned treatment with reference to individual merits or needs. 
Equality and proportionality, while theoretically significant only by 
their reference to the "co-finality" principle, cannot become practi-
cally operative without having been adjusted to different historical 
and social conditions. 
In this perspective, justice-value does not appear as specifically 
determined; it does not establish immediately and univocally what 
one ought or ought not to do in a given specific situation. In spite 
of this indeterminancy, justice (in the sense here attributed to it) 
cannot be regarded either as an empty or as a (per se) relative value. 
The principle according to which individuals are co-final is always 
operative in any legal or moral settlement of human relations so far 
as this settlement is constructed in terms of pure reasonableness 
without influence of emotions or irrational motivations. Particular-
ly, "co-finality" of individuals can be often viewed as implicit in at-
tribution of individual rights and in their relations. It certainly re-
lates to rights of personal dignity and liberties granted by demo-
cratic constitutions. It relates to many particular provisions in var-
ious fields of positive law. 
The above remarks could be further elaborated but the relevant 
discussion would go beyond the scope of this article. The specific 
purpose of this article was to show that a teleological perspective is 
to be viewed as underlying all the ought-formulations intelligible in 
rational terms, both in the field of morals and of positive law. In 
other words the assumption of this perspective may be regarded as 
the most suitable way (if not the only one) in which practical and 
legal problems can be examined and understood within a framework 
of reasonableness. 
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